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One important aspect of the faculty of language, as understood in generative grammar, is its 
capacity to form operator-variable structures. Such structures are crucial for definite descrip-
tions, as understood in the broadly Russellian tradition. The paper proposes a research pro-
gram for exploring the relation between the uniquely human ability for “knowledge” (more 
properly, cognition) by description and the capacity of the language faculty to produce op-
erator-variable structures. 
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I defend the reasonableness of a research program which applies ideas largely associated 
with Bertrand Russell’s philosophy of language and epistemology toward explaining some ele-
ments of human cognitive uniqueness, what Marc Hauser has called “humaniqueness” (2009). 
It would be a program which rightfully blurs the distinction between philosophy and science, a 
distinction which has often been blurred before. 
The program would be an attempt to understand how humans are capable of thinking 
about unobservables while other species are not. It does not entail the claim that this exhausts 
humaniqueness; there could well be other facets of humaniqueness not addressed in this paper. 
An analogous program, currently underway, is the attempt to understand the uniquely human 
ability for unbounded counting. There is empirical evidence indicating that this latter ability 
depends upon language (Spaepen et al., 2011). It has been suggested by a number of cognitive 
scientists that the recursive nature of language underlies our capacity to grasp the integer series, 
on the grounds that this series can be recursively defined (Hauser et al., 2002; Wiese, 2003). 
I am proposing an analogous research program: the human ability to think of unobserv-
ables depends upon the ability to generate sentences containing definite descriptions. There are 
several different ways in which the idea could be developed, which is why I emphasize the word 
“program”. It could be that sentences containing definite descriptions, produced by the language 
faculty, directly enter into thought. That could be the whole story. It is also possible that there is 
a pre-existing language of thought, lacking the power to produce definite descriptions just on its 
own, which is enriched by the language faculty. The language of thought could, for example, use 
the outputs of the language faculty as a template for forming its own definite descriptions. The 
power of the language faculty to form definite descriptions depends, in turn, upon its capacity to 
produce variables bound by quantifiers. In linguistics, this capacity is usually understood in terms 
of computations executed by the language faculty. This latter point will be elaborated upon in the 
course of the paper. 
In saying that only humans think about unobservables, I want to clarify that I am not speak-
ing of displaced reference per se. I am speaking of reference to objects and properties which lie 
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beyond what the sense organs were designed to register (“de-
sign” here referring to design by natural selection). In other 
words, by hypothesis, there is an evolutionarily older seman-
tic system oriented towards the observable environment, and 
a newer system, plausibly unique to our species (Berwick and 
Chomsky, 2016), which serves for representing unobservables 
as well. The challenge is to understand what is unique to this 
newer system, e.g. what computations belong exclusively to it. 
That a mental system for tracking observables came first 
is virtually a truism. A number of philosophers have defend-
ed the view that responsiveness to the environment, via the 
sense organs, is a conceptually necessary condition for inten-
tionality. Although couched in terms of conceptual necessity, 
the point is best understood as biological. Tracking environ-
mental variables, and either changing the environment or 
one’s relation to it, are what minds are for. According to Jona-
than Bennett (1976), one can only understand intentionality 
in terms of goal-directedness; one can, in turn, only recognize 
goal-directedness if the organism “registers” features of its 
environment pertaining to changes needed to reach the goal. 
The organism may, for example, register the presence of food 
and thus be able to change its position to bring itself closer to 
the food. Quoting Gilbert Harman, “In elementary cases, a 
belief state that represents a particular thing normally results 
from the perception of that thing and leads to behavior in-
volving that thing” (1973, p. 62). 
Speaking of goal-directedness not only presupposes 
environmental sensitivies, but also the organism’s making a 
mark upon the world. Given that there is no intentionality 
without goal-directedness, I have to express some sympathy 
with philosophers who have insisted that semantics involves, 
at least in the most primitive case, the effects of the sign. This 
includes both effects upon behavior as well as effects upon 
the environment resulting from behavior (Wittgenstein and 
Waismann, 2003, Ch. 5; Honderich, 2004, p. 193). Here too, 
we find observability. In the most primitive case, the organ-
ism exhibits goal-directedness by manipulating things which 
it can perceive. Tracking and reacting to objects in the envi-
ronment is the background assumption of normality in inter-
preting an animal’s mental semantics. Although this is far too 
simple for interpreting human mental semantics, the human 
ability to represent unobservables likely remains a derivative 
sort of meaning, contingent upon a more basic or core sort of 
mental semantics. This core would crucially involve connec-
tions to the environment via sense organs. 
Turning to Russell, there are, of course, great differences 
between his approach and virtually any naturalistic approach. 
Be that as it may, I want to emphasize similarities. For Russell, 
semantics involves a core and a periphery: the core involves 
symbols which refer to observables, the periphery includes 
designation of unobservables via the addition of quantifiers 
to the lexicon (Russell, 1912, 2007; Ostertag, 1998). In other 
words, there is a relatively primitive system involving a se-
mantics of observables, and a fortified system which crosses 
the line, so to speak, by including a semantics of unobserv-
ables. The latter is built upon the former as its foundation 
via the addition of quantification. (I am not including here 
Russell’s discussion of logical data (1992, Ch. 9). Presumably, 
the semantics of logical constants can be understood in terms 
of their roles in inference relations, rather than acquaintance 
with abstract objects.) The addition of quantification to the 
system permits the definition of terms designating unob-
served entities and properties in terms of their relations, often 
causal relations, with observed entities and properties. 
One limitation in Russell’s approach, in my opinion, 
was his focus on what has actually been observed, as opposed 
to what is observable. For example, a primitive, pre-quanti-
ficational system could perhaps be able to represent Hume’s 
missing shade of blue, because the shade, even though never 
observed, is observable. That is, the primitive system is bi-
ologically adapted to represent all shades of blue, because 
the eyes were designed to be sensitive to the entire color 
spectrum. Furthermore, as will be discussed presently, the 
semantic system and the sensory organs were designed to 
work together. This picture of “primitive” thought without 
quantification is similar to C.R. Gallistel’s view of non-hu-
man animal mental representation. Gallistel, summarizing 
literature on non-human animal cognition, characterizes 
it in terms of representations, where a representation is an 
isomorphism between a neural property or process and “an 
aspect of the environment to which these processes adapt 
the animal’s behavior” (1990, p. 2). 
For Russell, some expressions in human language which 
superficially appear to be names cannot be. He proposed that 
quantification serves to restrict the extension of a predicate, 
or conjunction of predicates, so that it applies to at most one 
thing, resulting in a phrase which resembles a name in its ex-
tension even though containing no constituent which could 
plausibly be identified as a name (except for predicates which 
could perhaps be construed as names of properties). For ex-
ample, the act of building is observable. The Moon is observ-
able. The one who built the Moon is not observable, but one 
can conceive of that entity by means of quantification. One 
way to do it would be to form the thought that there is ex-
actly one x such that x built the Moon. This would explain 
the human ability to conceive of unobservables. Because this 
includes our myth-making capacity, I prefer the term “cogni-
tion by description” over Russell’s “knowledge by description”. 
The details of the theory of descriptions have varied 
through the years, as it has been streamlined by various people 
(Chomsky, 1977; Neale, 1990). What matters for this discus-
sion, and what is part of the core of the research program on 
offer, is the use of quantifier-variable constructions, as such, in 
the analysis of sentences containing descriptions. By means of 
quantification, the extension of a predicate can be restricted, 
for example, to one individual. Definite descriptions make it 
possible for us to think about things which are not observ-
able, and quantification crucially enters into the analysis of 
sentences featuring descriptions. In other words, there is an 
ancient reservoir of semantic primitives belonging to a sys-
tem designed only for tracking observables. But the addition 
of quantification allows one to construct new representations 
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from this system for forming thoughts about unobservables. 
(It also permits one to represent observables in a new way.) 
Note that combinatorial functors as such would not suffice. 
Combining a symbol for wings with a symbol for horse is not 
enough for one to entertain the thought that there might be a 
horse with wings. That thought requires quantification. 
The understanding of research programs here is Laka-
tosian (Lakatos, 1978). There is a hard core of assumptions 
which which serves as a constant backdrop, and inspiration, 
for more specific hypotheses. It is the latter which are directly 
tested. The hard core here would be the view that thinking of 
unobservables is unique to humans by virtue of the language 
faculty being unique to them. This faculty produces sentenc-
es containing definite descriptions, thus making cognition by 
description possible. A crucial factor in its producing sentenc-
es containing descriptions are the computational operations 
which produce the bound variables which enter into quantifi-
er phrases. This much would be the hard core of the program. 
An example of a more specific hypothesis, outside the hard 
core, would be speculation as to the precise computations 
which set up the operator-variable relation. Hypotheses as 
to how specifically the language faculty interacts with other 
mental faculties, in the process of cognizing by description, 
would also lie outside of the hard core. 
In fact, the ethologist Daniel Povinelli has already taken a 
similar approach to explaining the human capacity for thinking 
of unobservables, perhaps without realizing the similarity be-
tween his viewpoint and that of Russell. Povinelli has amassed 
a great deal of experimental evidence which, on his interpreta-
tion, supports the claim that simians do not mentally represent 
unobservables. For Povinelli, only a human can think of an un-
observed something-or-other as playing a causal role in relation 
to observables, what Povinelli calls a “causal variable” (2012). 
The causal variable is something which is wholly defined, ulti-
mately, in terms of its relation to observables. 
One could point out a number of discontinuities be-
tween Russell and Povinelli: It is not entirely clear what log-
ical form Povinelli has in mind, he does not explicitly refer 
to descriptions, and Povinelli is not discussing sense data. 
But I find the continuities with Russell more important than 
the discontinuities. Povinelli is at least implying that the hu-
man brain uniquely possesses some means of forming opera-
tor-variable structures for representing unobservables. 
Observability
A core assumption of the program is that non-human 
mental semantics is designed to track observables, and fails 
to represent unobservables. An objection to the program is 
that it assumes a distinction which was apparently discredit-
ed long ago in the philosophy of science literature (Maxwell, 
1962), namely the distinction between observational terms 
and theoretical terms. As part of a dialectic for discrediting 
this distinction, Paul Feyerabend proposed a criterion for dis-
tinguishing observational terms from theoretical terms which 
he then quickly dismissed in the face of a simple objection. 
Provisionally, Feyerabend suggested that 
a concept is an observational concept if the 
truth-value of a singular statement contain-
ing either only that concept, or that concept 
along with other observational concepts, 
can be determined quickly and solely on 
the basis of observation, or at least if it is 
imaginable that a decision of this kind will 
be possible someday (the backside of the 
moon was observable, in this sense, even 
before the publication of the first picture). 
A concept is a theoretical concept if in or-
der to determine the truth-value of a singu-
lar statement which contains it, theories, in 
addition to observations, are also required 
(1960, p. 16).2
As everyone knows, of course, Feyerabend proceeded to 
dismiss this attempt at drawing a distinction. He noted that 
science demands criteria for detecting the presence of even 
the most hidden, tiny, or distant phenomena, e.g. vapor trails 
in a cloud chamber indicating electrons. If the criteria are 
not yet available, the demand for criteria remains until they 
become available. With such criteria, a scientist can reach a 
point in which they quickly infer from the presence of the cri-
terion to the supposedly theoretical entity. An electrician, to 
use one of his examples, can quickly check for the presence of 
voltage just by touching with a finger. But this ability dissolves 
the distinction between the observational and the theoretical, 
or at least this was Feyerabend’s conclusion. 
But why was the provisional distinction even remotely 
plausible in the first place? What does observability have to 
do with making a quick judgment? I submit that the opera-
tive concept here is naturalness. This was the grain of reason 
in the distinction, as Feyerabend framed it. There is a sense 
in which one applies observational concepts naturally where-
as theoretical concepts are artificial. If this is the underlying 
distinction, we can drop the reference to speed of judgment. 
Natural selection will enter into the definition instead: our 
brains were designed by natural selection to represent objects 
and properties which our sense organs were also designed to 
register. In other words, the brain and sense organs were de-
signed to work together. But the ability to think about un-
observables, by contrast, would be an accidental offshoot of 
the language faculty, making it possible for the brain to form 
representations of things which the sense organs were not de-
signed to register. 
2 English translation by D. Sirtes and E.M. Oberheim appears in Feyerabend (1999, p. 16-49). All quotes and page references in the text 
are to the latter. 
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Harman notes that, in the most elementary case, normal 
functioning constrains representation. I submit that normal 
functioning can be understood in terms of design. In the case 
of the human being, design is understood in terms of natural 
selection. Quoting Harman,
A device that takes data from radar and 
fires guns to shoot down planes represents 
the planes as at a particular location and 
as going to be at a different location. That 
description is appropriate because radar 
waves from the planes influence what we 
call the representation of the planes; and 
that representation plays a role in firing the 
guns that shoot them down. We can say this 
even though the guns miss as a result of a 
sudden change of course or even though a 
flock of birds sets off the cycle. We can say 
it because we have a conception of the nor-
mal operation of the device. That enables 
us to retain this way of talking about the 
device even when it is disconnected from 
radar and guns for a test in the laboratory. 
On the other hand, if our conception of nor-
mal working is different, the device must be 
described differently. If the planes are not 
likely to be what is responsible for the radar 
signals – and if the response is not correct 
for shooting down planes – and if nothing 
has gone wrong with the machine – then 
we would not suppose that it represents 
where planes have been and are going to 
be (1973, p. 63).
In other words, the semantics of the device, specifically 
of its representations, is limited to observables. Further, what 
counts as an observable for the device is understood in terms 
of what the device was designed to track. 
Note that this distinction between observables versus 
unobservables is only meant to cast light on cognitive evo-
lution. It is not meant to do any work in epistemology, such 
as philosophy of science. It is perfectly compatible with the 
claim that there is no tenable theory/observation distinc-
tion in science, and perfectly compatible with Jerry Fodor’s 
claim that
while observation is supposed to be con-
strained by a conceptual connection be-
tween what one can observe and how one 
can see things, the data for a theory are just 
whatever confirms its predictions, and can 
thus be practically anything at all (including, 
by the way, bits and pieces of other theo-
ries). So, the data for big bang cosmology 
include “observations” of the cosmic micro-
wave background; the data for Mendelian 
genetics include the “observed” ratios of 
traits in the offspring of heterozygotes; the 
data for the gene theory include Mendel’s 
“observation” (i.e., they include the Men-
delian law) that heterozygotes breed true; 
the data for parsing theories include “ob-
served” asymmetries of reaction times be-
tween subjects listening to sentences of re-
lated syntactic types. And so on. […] It’s fine 
to let psychology settle what an observation 
is. And it’s equally fine to forget about psy-
chology and just let the observations be the 
data (Fodor, 1991, p. 208).
For present purposes, I am letting evolutionary psy-
chology settle what an observable is, but this is no comment 
whatsoever as to what count as data in science. It is simply an 
attempt to understand humaniqueness. Although I appeal to 
philosophy of science in discussing Lakatos, this is not philos-
ophy of science.
Letting natural selection serve to distinguish obser-
vational representations from what could roughly be called 
theoretical representations must itself be an ongoing research 
program. The challenge would be to distinguish current util-
ity from utility in the ancestral environment, only the latter 
being criterial for the distinction. The appeal to natural selec-
tion would thus initially yield only vague results. But at the 
beginning of a research program, vagueness is not a serious 
objection. Clarity is often the result of extensive research, 
rather than its precondition. 
I do not believe that one should be deterred by argu-
ments meant to show that the very concept of natural selec-
tion is confused. The important thing is that the research pro-
gram of evolutionary biology remains progressive. It is well 
known that Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) have argued 
that we should abandon natural selection as a scientific con-
cept, on the grounds of its being incoherent (cf. Hornstein, 
2010). To recap their argument very briefly: given that there 
are no laws of natural selection, the only way to distinguish 
blind selection from selection for a specific trait is to ascribe 
intentionality to natural selection. But evolutionary biology 
works with the notion of selection for specific traits. Given 
that this is supposed to be hard-headed science, one cannot 
treat natural selection as exhibiting intentionality: “natural 
selection doesn’t have a mind” (Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 
2010, p. 120). Thus, we have a contradiction. But I do not 
believe that the contradiction is damning of scientific appeals 
to natural selection, even if an answer to the challenge is not 
immediately obvious. Lakatos noted that a research pro-
gram can contain contradictions while remaining progressive 
(1999, p. 81ff). To use Lakatos’ own example, Bohr’s model of 
the atom contradicted Maxwell’s theory, even though Bohr 
was firmly committed to the latter. In other words, Bohr was 
in the awkward position of affirming that electrons jump 
orbits while also assuming that electrons take a continuous, 
spiral path toward the nucleus. Lakatos also notes that Bohr 
was in the awkward position of contradicting geometry: the 
electron has no intermediate location when it jumps between 
orbits. However, in hindsight, we can say that Bohr was right 
not to abandon his model of the atom. 
John Bolender
Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(2): 136-143, may/aug 2016 140
Internal Merge
Another possible objection concerns computation. The 
core of the research program refers to uniquely human men-
tal comptuations, specifically whatever computations set up 
the binding relation between operator and variable. This pro-
gram is not a form of computer functionalism, since it is not 
meant to apply to all mental states. However, some qualms 
about computer functionalism, suitably modified, might lead 
one to hesitate about the current program. Here is an illus-
tration. In an article titled “Functionalism: Cognitive Science 
or Science Fiction?” (1998), Hilary Putnam notes that, in 
order to be scientific, computer functionalism must specify 
computations. One cannot empirically test functionalism 
without speaking of specific computations with specific em-
pirical ramifications. One cannot reduce computational psy-
chology to neuroscience — and this includes domain-specific 
reductions compatible with multiple realization — without 
indicating specific computational properties to be identified 
with specific neural properties. Without such specifications, 
computer functionalism is nothing more than science fiction, 
analogous to semantically empty talk of “dilithium crystals” 
and “warp drive” in Star Trek. We need to specify just which 
computations produce operator-variable constructions.
Fortunately, great progress has already been made 
in this regard. Contemporary generative linguistics pos-
its a computational operation, known as Internal Merge, 
which generates such structures (Chomsky, 2007). So the 
humaniqueness of Internal Merge could explain the hu-
maniqueness of cognition by description. This is one possi-
ble theoretical development of the research program, and I 
would like to dwell upon it. 
Internal Merge is a subcase of a broader category of 
computations collectively known as Merge. Merge as such is 
a structure building operation which is used in contemporary 
minimalist linguistics to build parsing trees. Understanding 
how these trees are composed is scientifically important, as 
studies involving brain imaging reveal that sentence struc-
ture is hierarchical (Pallier et al., 2011) and hence tree-like. 
Theoretically, Merge is an unconscious computation occur-
ring in the brain. Two syntactic constituents merge together 
at a time to form a branching structure. Given that Merge is 
recursive and sometimes operates in parallel, a parsing tree 
is composed from the bottom up. For example, the word eat 
merges with the word apples to form the verb phrase eat ap-
ples. The verb phrase eat apples can then be merged with the 
infinitive particle to to yield the infinitive phrase to eat apples. 
These phrases are understood as unordered sets which the 
systems of articulation and perception necessarily force into a 
linear format, partially on the basis of their hierarchical struc-
ture. In the case of “They had wanted to”, the spoken word 
order bears a clear relation to the hierarchical structure of the 
sentence: {they, {had, {wanted, {to, x}}}}. 
Let’s consider the generation of a definite description, 
namely what boys eat. Note that this phrase is roughly synon-
ymous with the thing boys eat, or that which boys eat, or the x, 
such that boys eat x, or for which x, boys eat x. It also has a plural 
interpretation, but note that some variants of the theory of 
descriptions assimilate singular and plural forms of definite 
descriptions, offering a single account for both (Chomsky, 
1977; Neale, 1990). Quoting Bolhuis et al. (2014, p. 2):
In our example ‘‘(Guess) what boys eat,’’ 
we assume that successive applications of 
merge … will first derive {boys, {eat, what}}—
analogous to {boys, {eat, apples}}. Now we 
note that one can simply apply merge to the 
two syntactic objects {boys,{eat, what}} and 
{what}, in which {what} is a subcomponent 
(a subset) of the first syntactic object rather 
than some external set. This yields some-
thing like {what, {boys, {eat, what}}}, in this 
way marking out the two required operator 
and variable positions for what.
In other words, what in the superordinate position functions 
as an operator binding an unpronounced variable serving as 
the direct object of eat:
what boys eat (what) = the x such that boys eat x.
The pronounced what binds the variable, i.e. determines 
its semantic properties, by virtue of the two objects being to-
ken identical, i.e. the same token occupies both positions. “At 
the sensorimotor side, only one of the two identical syntactic 
objects is pronounced, typically the structurally most salient 
occurrence” (Chomsky, 2007, p. 21). Given that what is a sub-
component of a syntactic object appearing at an earlier stage 
of the derivation, the form of Merge in question is known as 
Internal Merge (IM). It stands in contrast to External Merge 
(EM) which merges copies of items from the lexicon, or pos-
sibly some other external source. Hence, merging eat with 
apples to yield eat apples is EM. External Merge merges an 
object taken (or copied) from outside the derivation, while 
IM merges an object taken (or copied) from an earlier stage 
of the derivation. 
This is consistent with the eat in what boys eat requiring 
a direct object even though none is pronounced, the unpro-
nounced variable serving as the direct object of eat (Chomsky, 
2012, p. 264). This illustrates displacement in which an object 
is interpreted as though it is in one position even though it 
is pronounced in a different position, as in That I undertand. 
The binding relation is thus accounted for as a special case of 
the identity “relation”; what determines the semantic proper-
ties of x, in the expression {what, {boys, {eat, x}}}, because what 
and x are the same token object. 
On Figure 1 IM is represented by an arrow, which is 
standard. Note here that the food the boys will eat fits Russell’s 
definition of a definite description, given that it has the form 
the so and so. The phrase the food, in superordinate position, 
functions as a kind of operator binding the unprounced vari-
able in subordinate position, usually referred to as a trace (t). 
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The meaning of the definite description is something close to 
for which food x, the boys will eat x. The sentence is semantically 
close to We will guess what the boys will eat (Figure 2).
Apart from semantics, there is syntactic evidence for an 
unpronounced variable bound by the superordinate operator. 
This sort of evidence is familiar from the syntax literature 
(Radford, 1997 and references). Note the following pattern:
Plato said it
what Plato said
what Plato said *it
Only the third phrase is poorly constructed, as indicated 
by the star, and this is presumably because an unpronounced 
object functioning as the complement of said blocks insertion 
of another constituent, such as it. The presence of a phonet-
ically null variable also prevents full contraction. Note the 
following pattern:
Figure 1. A parsing tree illustrating the formation of an opera-
tor-variable structure by means of Internal Merge.
Figure 2. An operator-variable structure in which “what” has been 
internally merged. 
Figure 3. An illustration of the unpronounced trace between 
“say” and “has”.
Figure 4. A variant of the sentence in Figure 3.
he has said it
he’s said it
What he will say has been contested.
What he will *say’s been contested. 
The contraction say’s in the fourth construction sounds 
deviant, even though it is intuitively acceptable to say he’s said 
it. This is consistent with there being a variable in the com-
plement position after say blocking full contraction. Here is a 
parsing tree for a sentence containing the definite description 
the thing (that) he will say (Figure 3). 
The internally merged object in the superordinate posi-
tion functions as operator, and in the subordinate position as 
bound variable (Figure 4). 
On Figure 4 we see a semantically close sentence, with 
the definite description being headed by a wh- word. This 
evidently can also function as an operator. In both cases, the 
presence of the unpronounced variable blocks full contrac-
tion of say with has. 
If Internal Merge is unique to humans, this would ex-
plain why religion is unique to humans. Theoretically, IM is 
crucial for such definite descriptions as 
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 whom the celestial spheres move for = the x such that the ce-
lestial spheres move for x
 whom the starry sky hides = the x such that the starry sky 
hides x
 whom the mountains evidence = the x such that the moun-
tains evidence x
(Note that evidence in the above is used as a verb.)
In other words, IM plays a role in the construction of 
phrases used to define terms meant to designate divinities. 
The humaniqueness of IM would also account for a crucial 
component of human scientific capacity. By extension, the 
ability to represent definite descriptions would play a crucial 
role in uniquely human curiosity (İnan, 2012). 
IM just as plausibly enters into the construction of 
wh-phrases used in defining scientific terms, e.g.
 what electricity evidences = the x such that electricity evi-
dences x
 what magnetic attraction evidences = the x such that mag-
netic attraction evidences x
 what planetary perturbations evidence = the x such that 
planetary perturbations evidence x
Earlier, I suggested that natural selection could serve as 
a criterion for distinguishing an observational conceptual sys-
tem from the added capacity for generating theoretical con-
cepts. Note that if one uses natural selection to identify which 
mental representations are observational then our grasping of 
the integer series would also count as cognition by descrip-
tion. It is not likely that unbounded counting is a Darwinian 
adaptation, since it is exercised in few gatherer-hunter cul-
tures. It is more plausibly viewed as a side-product of Merge 
which also accounts for the unboundedness of language by 
reason of being recursive: “If the lexicon is reduced to a single 
element, then unbounded Merge will easily yield arithmetic” 
(Chomsky, 2007, p. 20). Note also that, like descriptions, the 
use of integers plausibly involves quantifier-variable struc-
tures, e.g. there are 5 x, such that … x. Hence, the attempt to un-
derstand cognition by description in terms of variable binding 
could perhaps be combined with the attempt to understand 
counting in such terms. 
Why would IM be unique to humans? There are at least 
two possibilities. One is that Merge as such is unique to humans 
(Hauser et al., 2002; Bolhuis et al., 2014). Another possibility is 
that, while Merge may play some cognitive role in other spe-
cies, the specific sub-case of Merge known as Internal Merge 
is nonetheless uniquely human. (In other words, IM could be 
the “narrow language faculty” (cf. Hauser et al., 2002; Fitch et 
al., 2005), rather than recursion per se.) One possible expla-
nation for this could be that IM places demands on working 
memory which EM alone does not require (Piattelli-Palmarini 
and Uriagereka, 2005; Uriagereka, 2008). Note that the arrow 
symbol in each of the parsing trees above represents a stage in 
the derivation of the sentence in which an earlier stage is ac-
cessed. The necessary search procedure — seeking an appro-
priate constituent from an earlier derivational stage, known as 
“Probe-Goal search” (Chomsky, 2001) — is a cognitive expense 
not incurred by EM alone. Some linguists have argued that 
EM is more cognitively expensive than IM, since the former 
involves scanning the entire lexicon for a suitable item, a much 
larger search space than merely probing the derivational his-
tory (Larson, 2015 and references). But this overlooks the dis-
tinction between short-term memory versus long-term mem-
ory. IM exercises the former, while EM, as it involves external, 
presumably lexical, search, exercises the latter. It is perfectly 
conceivable that a system would have a well-developed long-
term memory capacity and a relatively undeveloped short-
term memory capacity. As we are speaking here of hominin 
evolution, the question is clearly empirical. 
A final point: there is something of a rumor in cogni-
tive science that generative grammar neglects semantics. 
If one assumes this to be true, one may wonder how the 
mere addition of a syntactic operation could have such 
significant cognitive effects as those suggested above. To 
the contrary, the discussion of this paper illustrates that 
generative grammar does not neglect semantics. The point 
of Chomsky’s modularity is that syntax is more basic than 
semantics, not that the two have totally independent 
existences. Syntax is independent of semantics in some-
thing like the way that atoms are independent of moun-
tains: you can say what an atom is without mentioning 
mountains, but this does not mean that there could be 
mountains without atoms. One can explain what Internal 
Merge is without any mention of semantics. But that does 
not mean that there could be the semantics of quantifier 
phrases without Internal Merge. 
My aim has been to show that, despite possible objec-
tions, there is enough plausibility in this program to make 
it worthwhile to pursue. The fundamental idea is that the 
uniquely human language faculty carries with it the computa-
tional power to generate quantifier phrases, which enter into 
definite descriptions and cognition by description in ways al-
ready familiar to the philosophical community. This capacity 
makes it possible for humans, but not other species, to think 
about unobservables. The project of developing this idea in 
detail is potentially highly cross-disciplinary with contribu-
tions from biology, linguistics, neuroscience, paleoanthropol-
ogy, and archaeology, as well as from philosophy of language 
and epistemology. 
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